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‘What gets measured gets done’: exploring the social
construction of globalized knowledge for development
Ruth Buchanan, Kimberley Byers and Kristina Mansveld

Abstract: The project of international development can be
understood as a way of seeing the world that is both constituted by
and interwoven with evolving processes of measurement,
comparison and quantification. Drawing on the sociological insight
that regimes of measurement can never be ‘neutral’ representations
of external ‘objects’, but are instead actively engaged in shaping
what can be known, this chapter critically examines the ways in
which the production of globalized rankings and metrics are
imbricated with the production of the social and economic
hierarchies that development as a project seeks to ameliorate. The
chapter illustrates the mechanisms and effects of this co-production
of the development project and its practices of quantification,
through a close consideration of the case of Millennium
Development Goal 7 Target D.
‘What we know about the world is intimately linked to our sense
of what can we can do about it, as well as to the felt legitimacy
of specific actors, instruments and courses of action.’1
‘What gets measured gets done.' - MDG Final Report, 2015

A. Introduction
The project of international development can be understood as a
way of seeing the world that is both constituted by and interwoven
with evolving processes of measurement, comparison and
quantification. What development is understood to be and how it is
measured are mutually constitutive processes. Development
emerges as a way of locating ‘underdeveloped’ states in relation to
the rich world after the Second World War.2 Since the postwar era,
the definition and objectives of development have evolved in
tandem with available data sets. 3 Drawing on the sociological
Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society’ in Sheila Jasanoff
(ed), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order
(Routledge 2004) 14.
2
Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic
Growth and the Politics of Universality (CUP 2011).
3
E Wayne Nafziger, 'From Seers to Sen: The Meaning of Economic
Development' in George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks (eds), Advancing
1
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insight that regimes of measurement can never be ‘neutral’
representations of external ‘objects’, but are instead actively
engaged in shaping what can be known, this chapter approaches
the various rankings and metrics created by development
institutions as practices that are both integral to and constitutive of
the project of development.
The proliferation of international development indices over
the past several decades has made knowledge production for
development an important arena of inquiry for socio-legal scholars
interested in international institutions and governance. 4 A
considerable amount of research has been conducted on the
mechanisms by which credibility and influence over development
policy are acquired through the production and dissemination of
quantified and commensurable data sets.5 We know, for example,
that the reliance upon quantitative and measurable targets are
favoured by international institutions such as the World Bank,
possessing the financial and professional resources to create and
monitor the necessary knowledge collection infrastructures. 6 The
imperative to produce tangible measures of development outcomes
is usually rationalized in terms of benefits, such as the ability to
focus on particular issues, increased accountability, and improved
policies. And yet it is also well established that these practices of
quantification are ‘bound up in entanglements of power’ and can
work to inscribe hierarchies.7 Research has documented the variety
of productive effects, both intended and unintended, that are bound
up with indicators’ growing significance as a technology of
governance, including their key role in shaping ‘what can be
known at any given time, as well as how that knowledge can be

Development (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 50. See also Dudley Seers, 'The
Meaning of Development' (1969) IDS Communication 44, Institute of
Development Studies.
4
Kevin E Davis et al., Governance by Indicators: Global Power through
Classification and Rankings (OUP 2012); Kevin E Davis and Benedict
Kingsbury, ‘Indicators as Interventions: Pitfalls and Prospects in Supporting
Development Initiatives’ (Report, Rockefeller Foundation 2011); Doris Buss,
‘Measurement Imperatives and Gender Politics: An Introduction’ (2015) 22(3)
Social Politics 381 <http://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxv030>.
5
Richard Rottenburg et al. (eds), The World of Indicators: The Making of
Governmental Knowledge through Quantification (CUP 2015).
6
David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape
Global Political Economy (1st edn, Princeton University Press 2016).
7
Buss (n 4); Tor Krever, ‘Quantifying Law: Legal Indicator Projects and the
Reproduction of Neoliberal Common Sense’ (2013) 34(1) Third World Q 131;
Amanda Perry-Kessaris, 'Prepare Your Indicators: Economics Imperialism on
the Shores of Law and Development' (2011) 7(4) Int J Law Context 401
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1017/S174455231100022X>.
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used.’ 8 Yamin and Fukuda Parr have noted, in relation to the
Millennium Development Goals, that they had the capacity to
‘redefine the framework for understanding the purpose of
development, the key constraints and the means to address them.’9
Development indices determine which information counts, and
which doesn’t, for the purpose of identifying desirable
development outcomes and orienting future development policy.
As measures of development have proliferated, so have
debates over the appropriateness or suitability of competing
measurement regimes. Tracking development outcomes is a
complex social process that involves a series of evaluative
decisions, including what is to be the target of measurement, which
indicators will be chosen to stand as proxies for the target, and
which institutions or practices will be utilized for measuring,
compiling, and tracking. These decisions all matter a great deal to
the intended beneficiaries of development policies - poor states and
their citizens - and yet their role in these processes of knowledge
production is, for the most part, passive and limited. The ‘power of
numbers’ used in this way lies in the process by which these
difficult and contestable choices become submerged, or ‘blackboxed’ in the ensuing indicator, such that the resulting ‘data’
appear straightforward and ‘factual’. 10 Moreover, that some
‘objects’ (income poverty, maternal mortality) seem inherently
‘measurable’ while others (community empowerment, tenure
security) seem to resist measurement is itself an effect of an
already existing ‘information infrastructure that has ‘preformatted’ categories, data, and concepts in order to render them
countable.’ 11 While some commentators have identified in the
emergence of various ‘alternative’ indices the potential for
contestation, it is also clear that the most powerful and effective
indicators are those that globally commensurate—that is, they
function to dis-embed data from local contexts, facilitating crossnational comparisons. To the extent that alternative indices seek to
re-embed salient local factors, or to revalorize overlooked
concerns, they encounter what Merry and Wood have described as
the ‘paradox of measurement’; that is, ‘indicators reveal
8

Buss, ibid. 3. See also Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems
of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (1st edn, University Of
Chicago Press 1998) 7.
9
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Alicia Ely Yamin, 'The Power of Numbers: A Critical
Review of MDG Targets and Indicators' (2013) 56(1) Development 58, 59.
10
Tony Porter, 'Making Serious Measures: Numerical Indices, Peer Review, and
Transnational Actor-Networks' (2012) 15(4) J INT RELAT DEV 532
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1057/jird.2011.15>.
11
Nehal Bhuta comment on Sally Engle Merry and Summer Wood,
‘Quantification and the Paradox of Measurement: Translating Children’s Rights
in Tanzania’ (2015) 56(2) Curr Anthropol 205, 219.
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information about issues that are already being measured well, but
they do not shed light on important problems that are not being
measured.’12
If development indicators are understood in this way – as
part of a thickening swarm of technologies of quantified
knowledge production and data circulating on a global scale –they
present a different sort of challenge to the researcher. In the place
of familiar debates over the adequacy and accuracy of data and the
selection of appropriate indicators, a different and more salient
question emerges: whether and in what ways development
indicators function to constitute and maintain the global
inequalities that the development project is charged with
dismantling. 13 This chapter seeks both to encapsulate this
methodological reorientation with reference to the burgeoning
literature on indicators and development, as well as to provide one
cogent illustration of the process of co-evolution in the definition
and measurement of development outcomes through a brief
account of MDG 7D.
As we detail below, the ‘slum’ - as a way of both seeing
and measuring urban poverty - was explicitly drawn into
international development discourse through a Cities Alliance
Report entitled ‘Cities without Slums’, from which the Millennium
Declaration drew its modest objective. This objective was
subsequently incorporated into Millennium Development Goal #7,
on sustainable development, which included as one of its targets;
‘to bring about, by 2020 significant improvements in the lives of at
least 100 million slum-dwellers’. Through the high level
endorsement of the MDG’s by international institutions, this target,
also known as the Cities without Slums target, quickly became a
highly influential mechanism for the production of knowledge for
urban development, notwithstanding numerous challenges
associated with its definition and tracking. The successful
achievement of this modest target was announced well before the
conclusion of the MDG project in 2015. However, the MDG Final
Report also noted that between 2000 and 2015, the absolute
number of slum-dwellers globally had increased by 88 million to
an estimated total of 880 million between 2000 and 2015. During
the same timeframe, a series of UN Habitat Reports documented
the ongoing problem of wide-scale summary evictions of urban
slum-dwellers. These data suggest that the ‘success’ of the target in
achieving its overall objective of ‘improving the lives of slumdwellers’ is at the very least debatable, and that a closer
examination of the relationship between goals and metrics is called
12

Ibid. 212.
See generally Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (ch 2, Harvard
University Press 2000).
13
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for. In this chapter, we are most interested in what new forms of
knowledge are being produced and put into circulation by the
international community’s decision to ‘target slums’.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section situates
the development project, locating its origins in a historical moment
that gave rise both to a new type of knowledge about national
economies and a way of distinguishing between those economies
that are ‘underdeveloped’ and those that are developed. In the
second section, we provide a snapshot of the scholarship on expert
knowledge as a world-making practice and, in particular, the
extensive literature on measurement, quantification, and indicators
that has emerged in the past two decades. From these broad
debates, we draw out insights specifically relating to the sociology
of knowledge construction for development, in order to begin to
frame a critical sociological approach to development indicators.
Finally, we illustrate how one might approach a specific
development indicator in this way through a brief description of
the formulation and implementation of Millennium Development
Goal 7.D (the Cities without Slums target).
B. What is development?
'Development ... is a specific way of knowing the world, which is both
discourse and institutional machinery.’14

Although it claims to offer pathways to the realization of universal
human aspirations for wellbeing, flourishing, or human freedom,
‘development’ is understood here as a particular (western) project
that incorporates both a way of seeing the world as well as a
process of initiation or enculturation into that way of seeing. This
two-part definition is echoed by Gilbert Rist, for whom
development can be understood as ‘a belief and a series of
practices which form a single whole in spite of contradictions
between them.’ 15 The world-making effects of development take
shape, largely, through the work of international institutions and
the ‘development’ projects that they support. It is through the
practices, reports, and statistics generated by these multilateral
institutions and agencies, so frequently located in the west and
Sundhya Pahjua, ‘Poverty and the Politics of Good Intentions’ in Ruth
Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights,
Development and Transitional Justice (Hart Publishing, 2014) 35. 'Development
has a very particular history, which is both a legacy of imperialism and
intimately intertwined with the history of contemporary international law. It is
not just a word; it is a specific way of knowing the world, which is both
discourse and institutional machinery.'
15
Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global
Faith (Zed Books, 2002) 24.
14
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headed up by westerners, that the particular ideals and aspirations
of the west are projected onto the rest of the world in the guise of
development as a universal good. This chapter approaches this
relation as an always in-process co-production, such that at any
given time, it is not possible to ask the question ‘what is
development’ without at the same time asking ‘how is it
measured’?
In orienting an account of the development project as a
specific way of looking at the rest (of the world) by the west, there
are multiple available starting-points, including many that mine the
writings of early jurists to trace continuities between colonial and
post-colonial eras.16 For our purpose in this chapter, however, of
particular relevance is the emergence of an idea and practice of
development in the post-war/Bretton Woods era. In this context,
President Truman’s inaugural address of January 1949 is a helpful,
albeit much remarked upon, keystone. Truman’s fourth point has
been identified as one of the first instances in which the word
‘underdevelopment’ makes its way into public discourse as a term
used to refer collectively to parts of the globe that had not, at that
time, industrialized. 17 What is of critical interest to us in this
chapter, however, is the way in which, in Truman’s fourth point,
that idea of ‘development’ is fused to a technology of
measurement, which in our account is critical to its emergence as a
powerful world-making assemblage.
The technology of measurement is, of course, economic
growth, as determined by emergent measures of Gross National
Product. Truman’s speech took place at a pivotal moment in the
emergence of the idea of a ‘national economy,’ dependent on new
methods of tracking and accounting for wealth developed by the
emerging field of economics and exemplified best by the measure
of GNP as a proxy for the economic output of an entire nation, first
developed in the US by economist Simon Kuznets. 18 Kuznets’s
work at the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research in the
16

The writings of jurists such as Franciso de Vitoria, Frederick Lugard, and
Henry Maine have all provided grist for this mill. See also Antony Anghie,
Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge
University Press 2005); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, ‘The Case for a Visualized
Economic Sociology of Legal Development’ (2014) 67(1) Curr Leg Probl 169
<http://doi.org/doi:10.1093/clp/cuu016>.
17
Rist (n 15); Luis Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of
International Law and Development (CUP 2015); Pahuja (n 2 60-62); Jennifer
Beard, The Political Economy of Desire: Law Development and the Nation
(GlassHouse, 2005); and many others have offered up particularly useful
analyses of Truman’s address.
18
Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil
(Verso Books 2011) 136ff. In relation to GNP, Mitchell cites Kuznets’s warning
that ‘a national total facilitates the ascription of independent significance to that
vague entity called the national economy’ (137) which clearly went unheeded.
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1930s had attracted the interest of policy-makers and led to a series
of conferences on conceptual and methodological issues relating to
macro-economic measures, at which the term Gross National
Product was first introduced as a macro-measure of economic
output. 19 During the Second World War, Kuznets effectively
applied that data collection and statistical modelling work on
national income growth in support of the U.S. war effort.20 In the
postwar era, the tracking of GNP growth became the ‘dominant
metric of economic performance across the western world’, and an
international approach to standardized national accounting based
very closely on Kuznets’s methodology was adopted by the UN by
1953.21 Notwithstanding warnings by Kuznets and others about the
limitations of the methodology, neoclassical growth theory
emerged as the new mainstream approach to economics, and GNP
(later GDP) became the ultimate proxy for national welfare. 22
Timothy Mitchell underscores the ‘world-making’ aspect of these
developments, noting the extent to which the ‘calculative
machinery’ of economics became imbricated with the world that it
was purporting to merely measure:
These transformations created in the twentieth century a political
and material world densely imbued with the expertise, calculative
techniques and conceptual machinery of modern economics. The
so-called material world of governments, corporations,
consumers and objects of consumption was arranged, managed,
formatted and run with the help of economic expertise. The
readiness with which it seemed that this world could be
manipulated and modeled by economics reflected not simply that
it was a naturally ‘quantitative’ world, as Schumpeter suggested.
It reflected the imbrication of the concepts and calculations of
economic science in the world it was studying.23

In Truman’s fourth point, these two key transformations of the
mid-twentieth-century are fused together. In his promise ‘to make
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’, Truman
defined the development project as a project of economic growth
(understood in terms of GNP). 24 In this way, the distinction
between ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘developed’ parts of the world and
the identification of the technical expertise for measuring progress
with the discipline of economics were brought together. The
19

Lorenzo Fioramonti, Gross Domestic Problem: The Politics Behind the
World’s Most Powerful Number (Zed Books 2013) 26-27.
20
Ibid. 31-32.
21
Ibid. 32.
22
Ibid. 51.
23
Mitchell (n 18) 139.
24
Pahuja (n 2) 64-65.
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outcome of this fusion is a reframing of the ‘old’ imperial
hierarchies into a ‘modern’ hierarchy determined not by power
relations but by economics. 25 As noted above, GNP was still a
relatively novel and limited aggregative measure of national
economic activity in 1949; Truman’s speech arguably facilitates
the transformation of Kuznets’s method for estimating levels of
domestic economic activity in the US into a figure used for the
measurement and comparison of economic activity among
developing states, and between developing and developed states.26
Notwithstanding the evident limitations of using a figure
that measures only ‘marketized’ economic activity to calculate and
compare productive activity across economies with widely varying
degrees of ‘marketization’, and in spite of critiques by Kuznets and
others that drew attention to its inaccuracies and inadequacies,
GNP growth quickly transmogrified into both the ‘objective and
yardstick of development.’ 27 That this alchemy so soon became
unremarkable exposes the constitutive or ‘world-making’ nature of
the development project that emerged in the postwar moment.
Truman’s speech illustrates that the project of international
‘development’ is conceived fundamentally as a project of
measurement, comparison, and quantification. Moreover, it reveals
the manner in which, from the outset, a perspective is embedded
from which it appears possible to ‘see’ a national economy as a
totality and to measure its successes and failures in aggregative
terms.
The apparent success of GNP as a way of ‘seeing’ an
economy should not be equated with an absence of struggle,
however. As David Kennedy has cogently argued, contestation
among experts over the best ways to measure and compare
economies, governance, growth, poverty, well-being, or human
rights are a defining feature of our globalized social order. 28
Debates over how to measure development have been in existence
as long as debates over the nature of development itself. As early
as 1969, in a foundational article ‘The Meaning of Development’,
Dudley Seers observed that international ‘development’ as it was
Ibid. 64. As Pahuja explains: ‘the specific way in which development rejected
race-based distinctions without challenging hierarchical organization or foreign
domination per se was to eschew the now dubious value claims of imperialism
and the newly discredited idea of racial superiority and to replace them with the
'scientific' measure of GNP.’
26
Rist puts it more directly: ‘Point Four simply imposed a new standard
whereby the United States stood at the top: namely, the Gross Domestic
Product’. Rist (n 15) 76.
27
Erik Thorbecke, ‘The Evolution of the Development Doctrine, 1950-2005’ in
George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks (eds), Advancing Development: Core
Themes in Global Economics (Palgrave MacMillan 2007) 5.
28
Kennedy (n 6).
25
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conceived and took shape in the postwar era was fundamentally a
project that operated through mechanisms of quantification that
were largely inadequate to the task.29 Seers was an early critic of
GDP as a measure of development; but he was not alone for long.
Indeed, development critics proliferated, and by the early 1990s,
the work of Amartya Sen on capabilities, along with a dramatic
increase in available statistics, facilitated the creation of the
Human Development Index, tied to the UNDP’s Human
Development Reports as an alternative framework for approaching
the work of development.30 The Human Development Reports, in
particular, sought to track a wider range of factors considered
relevant to the well-being of populations. The HDI generated its
own debates, which led in turn to the creation of several additional
indices. 31 In turn, and as we elaborate below, the Millennium
Development Goals were added to the mix, and new controversies
emerged over the identification of targets and indicators, how they
would be tracked, and which measures - and hence whose issues were to be given priority. At the time of writing, nearly sixty-eight
years have elapsed since Truman’s inaugural address, and what can
be observed of the intervening period is that while the measures of
development have proliferated, and competition between measures
has intensified, the fundamental connection between development
and indicators of development has remained in place.
C. Towards a critical sociology of development indicators
Measurement is never an innocent act. It is a thoroughly social
process, from the array of individuals and communities engaged in
the act of generating data, to the effects on the social relationships
and institutions that are the subjects of measurement. Categories of
people and behavior are created to enable counting, comparison
and ranking to take place, affecting how problems are defined and
emerge as worthy of attention.32

Sidestepping the longstanding debates within development studies
over the sufficiency or suitability of various indicators, this
chapter, rather, is located within a different body of scholarship
that seeks to examine the ways in which quantification, and
concomitant processes such as the production and tracking of
indicators, operate as mechanisms of knowledge production.33 As
governments, firms, and intergovernmental organizations have
29

Seers (n 3)..
Nafziger (n 3).
31
Elizabeth A Stanton, 'The Human Development Index: A History' (2007) 127
PERI Working Papers <http://scholarworks.umass.edu/peri_workingpapers/85>.
32
Buss (n 4) 1.
33
Jasanoff (n 1); Poovey (n 8).
30
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continued to expand the scope and complexity of data that they
gather and use for a variety of purposes, the study of
quantification, measurement and indicators has become an
increasingly significant (and crowded) field of scholarly interest. 34
Some of this work draws inspiration from (interdisciplinary)
science and technology studies, including the work of Jasanoff,
Callon, and Latour. Other contributions are more disciplinarily
rooted in the fields and methods of anthropology, sociology, or
history.35 In keeping with the mandate of the volume, this chapter
seeks to bring into focus what a sociological orientation to the
study of indicators and development might contribute to these
debates. To this end, we draw on the work of Espeland and
Stevens, who have provided a general framework for engaging in
the sociological analysis of the constitutive effects of social
processes of quantification, such those carried out under the rubric
of development. In particular, Espeland and Stevens have
identified five distinct mechanisms through which quantification
achieves its social effects. In this section, we will illustrate each of
these mechanisms—‘work’, ‘reactivity’, ‘discipline’, ‘polyvalent
authority’ and ‘aesthetics’, using examples from the burgeoning
scholarship on development indicators.
The first mechanism that Espeland and Stevens identify in
their methodological framework for the social study of
quantification is ‘work’. In their analysis, ‘work’ refers to the
necessary infrastructure that lies behind the generation of numbers.
It draws our attention to the processes by which the concepts and
categories for counting must be invented, and the mechanisms for
collecting and compiling the data that must be developed. Once
gathered and analysed, this new information will need to be
formatted and circulated to potential audiences, requiring
considerable investments of time and energy by people and
institutions, and yet, ‘we often forget how much infrastructure lies
behind the numbers that are the end product of counting
regimes.’ 36 Indeed, it is a frequently remarked upon feature of
successful measurement formats that the considerable amount of
work ‘behind’ the numbers becomes invisible. What is seen as
‘natural’ and even ‘value neutral’ are the products of that work—
34

Recent contributions to this field are diverse and they are numerous. Notable
among them are: Fukuda-Parr and Yamin (n 9); Kevin E Davis et al.,
'Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators' in Governance by Indicators:
Global Power through Classification and Rankings, Kevin Davis et al. (eds),
(OUP 2012); Merry and Wood (n 11); Krever (n 7).
35
Sally Engle Merry and Susan Bibler Coutin, 'Technologies of Truth in the
Anthropology of Conflict: AES/APLA Presidential Address, 2013' (2014) 41(1)
Am Ethnol 1 <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1111/amet.12055>.
36
Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L Stevens, ‘A Sociology of
Quantification’ (2008) 49(3) Eur. J. Soc. Theory 401, 411.
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categories of people and things, that they are seeking to measure,
along with the data that are gathered about these categories. So,
Yamin and Fukuda Parr note in relation to the MDG’s that ‘once
these numerical targets were set, they were perceived to be value
neutral. In fact, however, there were assumptions deeply embedded
in the MDG’s about the nature and purpose of development.’ 37
Scholars of quantification who work within the STS vocabulary
might describe this as a process of ‘black boxing’— once the
foundational controversies over a particular measurement are
settled, ‘the objects they produce can travel through networks
without their foundational controversies being questioned or
visible’.38
Attending to the work of quantification also allows us to
observe that the necessary institutional infrastructure is unequally
distributed in our world, and perhaps enables or even enjoins us to
attend more closely to what this unevenness might throw up. As
we described in the first section, the ‘development project’ as it
emerged in the postwar era was fundamentally a project of
measurement and comparison. Given that it is impossible to track
and compare what is not being counted, the lack of statistical
capacity in many poor countries becomes transformed into a key
development issue, and competes for funding with other worthy
projects addressing access to education, water and sanitation, or
adequate health care. The need for statistical capacity building in
poor countries became a key plank in the poverty reduction
strategy of the World Bank in the 1990s. 39 It remains a current
issue – the need for more and better data collection is reiterated in
the MDG Final Report in 2015. The observation, frequently found
in the literature, that indicators are created largely by experts in the
global North, but rely on data collection processes in the global
South has a variety of further implications.40 What happens next
‘when wealthy nation-states and international organizations try to
impose quantitative regimes globally, (and) some nations find it
difficult to comply’ is both complex and unpredictable, as our case
study of MDG 7D will illustrate.41
37

Fukuda-Parr and Yamin (n 9) 61.
Porter (n 10) 538. See also Bhuta (n 11); Davis et al., ‘The Local-Global Life
of Indicators: Law, Power and Resistance’ in Merry et al. (eds) The Quiet Power
of Indicators: Measuring Governance, Corruption and the Rule of Law (CUP
2015) 5.
39
For example, see Liam Clegg, 'Our Dream is a World Full of Poverty
Indicators: The US, the World Bank, and the Power of Numbers' (2010) 15(4)
New Political Economy 473 <http://doi.org/doi:10.1080/13563461003763170>.
A renewed effort to collect poverty data from households was announced in
2015
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/15/worldbank-new-end-poverty-tool-surveys-in-poorest-countries>.
40
Merry and Wood (n 11) 208.
41
Espeland and Stevens (n 36) 411.
38
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Further, Espeland and Stevens observe that the work of
measuring the world is intimately entangled with wider social and
political processes: ‘quantification usually is embedded in larger
social projects.’ 42 The story we have offered in the preceding
section of the co-emergence of the development project with a
newly consolidating metric for measuring economic ‘progress’ in
GNP is one illustration of this embedding, although we would
resist an account which makes either the political project or the
measurement project ontologically prior to the other.43 Taking an
approach to the construction and circulation of development
indicators that understands them as ‘the work that makes other
kinds of work possible’ allows for analyses that trace the ways that
particular indicators may function to advance, consolidate or
confound larger political projects. As Amanda Perry-Kessaris
observes of the World Bank’s longstanding promotion of foreign
direct investment as a development tool, by equating effective
governance with its impact on perceptions of the ‘climate for
investment’: ‘Indicators are the weapons of choice for the knights
of investment climate discourse.’ 44 Along similar lines, Tor
Krever’s account of the ways in which the World Bank’s
composite ‘rule of law’ indicator (under the auspices of its
Worldwide Governance Indicators project) functions to reify a
limited conception of lawfulness primarily identified with the
protection of private property, contracts, and judicial independence
reveal the extent to which this conception both fits within and
serves to advance neoliberal global legal order.45
‘Reactivity’ is Espeland and Steven’s second category; it is
intended to direct attention to the ways in which measurement
intervenes in the social worlds it purports to merely depict.
Measures, in their account, are reactive in that they cause people to
think and act differently. Sometimes these effects are intended,
such as when governments seek to meet an MDG target for the
education of girls by building more schools in poorer
neighbourhoods, or even when a state might seek to improve its
ranking in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ Index by reducing
the time it takes to get a business license. Unintended
consequences can and do arise in a variety of ways, either through
actors seeking to ‘game’ the indicator, or through the re-allocation
of resources to issues that are being tracked and away from equally
42

Ibid.
The idiom of ‘co-production’ is pertinent here, as a method which ‘does not
seek to foreclose competing explanations by laying claim to one dominant and
all-powerful truth. It offers instead a new way of exploring the waters of human
history, where politics, knowledge and intervention are continually in flux.’
Jasanoff (n 1) 43.
44
Perry-Kessaris, 'Prepare Your Indicators' (n 7) 402.
45
Krever (n 7).
43
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significant but unquantified (or unquantifiable) issues. Espeland
and Sauder explain that one common way for unintended
consequences to arise is when changes in behaviour become
‘decoupled from the processes the indicators are designed to reflect
or measure’.46 Given the already observed tendency for the ‘work’
behind an indicator to fade into the background—it should not be
surprising that development targets so often miss their mark.
The literature on development indicators is rich with
illustrations of the unintended and potentially undesirable effects
of measurement. The Millennium Development Goals in particular
have been subject to many strong critiques along these lines. The
‘Power of Numbers’ project, directed by Yamin and Fukuda Parr,
compiled case-studies on each of the Goals, all of which identified
some form of unintended or undesirable effect. 47 An often cited
case in point is that of MDG#2, the objective of which was to
achieve universal primary education, where a number of critics
have observed that poor countries were encouraged to focus
limited resources on ensuring higher enrolment rates at the primary
level. 48 The spin-off, however, was that overall quality of
education could suffer. Sufficient numbers of well-trained teachers
were not necessarily available to take on the larger number of
students, and where they were available, many faced dauntingly
larger classrooms. Students might have been recorded as enrolled,
but as the goal and its associated indicators did not incorporate a
consideration of whether they become literate, or in many cases,
whether they in fact ever finished primary education, it was
difficult to see the link between the objective of improving
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education and the metric of primary enrolments. 49 As Saith
succinctly sums up,
…focusing exclusively on indicators of educational enrolments has
inherent distortions: it pays no attention to the very high drop-out
rates in primary and secondary education in the developing
economies; it ignores issues of quality of outcomes; and it is blind
to the resources committed per child in the educational process.50

Ultimately, the targeting of primary education may have had the
effect of drawing resources away from secondary and tertiary
education sectors. 51 This is an illustration of the ways in which
successful indicators become powerful focal points for aligning
expectations and influencing behaviour.52 Once they are produced
and put into circulation, indicators can take on a ‘life of their own’,
in which it is possible, even likely, that some or all of the uses to
which they are put are ‘foreign to the intentions of the original
producers.’53
Espeland and Stevens’ third factor, which they call
‘discipline’, concerns the way in which quantification facilitates a
certain type of governance. That is, numbers can circulate easily
and appear straightforward to interpret, making it possible to
monitor or govern ‘at a distance’.54 This is made possible, largely,
through the work of ‘commensuration’ – ‘a process fundamental to
measurement that entails turning qualities into quantities that share
the same metric.’ 55 Development indicators (such as GNP)
simplify, exclude, and integrate information, making it possible to
track and compare the ‘progress’ of a diverse array of economies
and nations. Commensurability between developing nations should
be understood, however, as an effect or end product of a two-step
process in which first, vast amounts of information are made
irrelevant, and second, a shared metric is imposed upon what
remains.56 Commensuration is instrumental to the way in which the
49
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selection and tracking of indicators come to operate as mechanisms
of governance through its ability to transform ‘difference …into
magnitude… — a matter of more or less rather than of kind.’57
Development indicators ‘discipline’ governments and
institutions by making complex social and political choices and
judgments seem straightforward, by enhancing the role of experts
and the organizations that collect data at the expense of local
knowledge and decision-making, and displacing political judgment
and responsibility away from governing bodies.
Through the apparatus of science and measurement, the indicator
displaces judgement from governing bodies onto the indicator
itself, which establishes standards for judgement. Nevertheless,
indicators are inevitably political, rooted in particular conceptions
of problems and theories of responsibility. They represent the
perspectives and frameworks of those who produce them, as well
as their political and financial power. What gets counted depends
on which groups and organisations can afford to count.58

The necessary simplification of quantification also makes
information seem more authoritative. 59 Not all quantitative
measures have the same persuasive power, however; rather, the
‘polyvalent authority’ or legitimacy of a given measure is
something that groups or institutions behind an indicator must
work to secure. As Espeland and Stevens note, the acquisition and
mobilization of quantitative authority is a complex social and
institutional process, which ‘gets built into institutions, circulates,
and creates enduring structures that shape and constrain cognition
and behavior.’60 One might point to the World Bank’s measure of
absolute poverty as one such authoritative development indicator
that has shaped both cognition and behaviour (although not
uncontroversially).61 Authority is not fixed or absolute, however.
Rather, processes of authorization are ongoing and contested, as
Liam Clegg’s study of the complex struggles within and outside
the Bank between income-based and multidimensional measures of
poverty illustrates. 62 Attending to the struggles through which the
legitimacy of the poverty indicator is produced and contested is as
revealing for what is left out as much as for what is being
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debated.63 In the case of poverty indicators, the available ‘multidimensional’ measures of poverty are also highly reductive. In the
realm of development, one of the most widely recognized
multidimensional
development
indicators,
the
Human
Development Index, has been widely criticized on this point. 64
One of the key authors of the Human Development Reports,
Sakiko Fukuda Parr argues that the HDI only captures a small part
of what would be considered important within a ‘human
development’ framework, noting that ‘ironically, the success of the
HDI has only served to reinforce the narrow interpretation of
human development.’65 Another apparent paradox might be found
here in an apparently inverse relation between the narrowness or
reductivity of a particular metric, and its ability to be perceived and
to circulate as legitimate and authoritative. Clarity and simplicity
are essential if a new metric is to achieve a degree of recognition
and credibility in the crowded and contested market of
development indicators.
Goals use the power of numbers to communicate a development
agenda with a sense of scientific certitude and serious intent with
the potential for accountability. But, in reality, quantification
reduces complex and intangible visions such as development that
is inclusive into concrete and measurable objectives such as ‘all
children in school’.66

This brings us to Espeland and Stevens’s final category, which
seeks to draw our attention to the ‘aesthetics’ of how we make
pictures with numbers, observing that we tend to value clarity and
parsimony above other qualities in our visual information. In their
account, these qualities manifest the particular allure of numbers
noted above: their peculiar capacity to appear to make complex
phenomena comprehensible. This last category has, arguably,
become even more relevant to the work of the sociologist of
quantification in recent years. In our current social media
63
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environment, the circulation of seductively appealing
visualizations (infovis) of quantified information is rapid,
widespread, and frequently detached from relevant interpretive
context. 67 Although development agencies have become
increasingly sophisticated in their use of visual media to publicize
various metrics in recent years, the role of aesthetics in the
creation, circulation, legitimation, and influence of development
indicators has, in our review of the literature, not yet been well
studied.68
The visualization of data, along with the background work
of determining what and how to count, the adaptations of those
being counted (in our case, developing states), the legitimacy
acquired by particular indicators and the disciplining or
governance effects of metrics in circulation - each play a
significant role in determining ‘what gets done’.
D.
Toward a sociology of the slum target:
Development Goal 7. D

Millennium

‘Numbers often help constitute the things they measure by directing
attention, persuading, and creating new categories for apprehending the
world’.69

In this final section, and with the foregoing methodological
roadmap in mind, we offer a brief account of the Millennium
Development Goals process and the formulation, implementation,
and dissemination of MDG 7.D in particular. Our account seeks to
trace the widening ripples that result from the insertion of a new,
quantified, target into the complex array of existing programs and
policy relating to urban poverty, informal settlements, property,
tenure, water, and sanitation already being advanced by global
institutions including Cities Alliance, UN-Habitat and UNDP.
This account is intended to be suggestive, rather than conclusive.
That is, it is not our aim here to demonstrate the impacts of the
67
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slum target, but rather, to illustrate how, through (re)framing our
orientation to the study of the target, that the question of its effects
presents itself as legitimate terrain for future research.
The disconnect between the aspirations expressed in the
Millennium Declaration – that it would inaugurate an era of
people-centered development policies, guided by a human
development framework and respectful of human rights – and the
Millennium Development Goals process that followed has been
widely commented on.70 Yet our analysis suggests that it is how
we characterize the social processes which unfolded in that space
that matters: was it merely a process of translation, of information
gathering for the purpose of policy making and increased
accountability, or a globalized imposition of categories with
consequences on poor countries?
While a detailed, sociologically oriented history of the
process by which a group of objectives became identified in the
Declaration and were eventually ‘translated’ into 8 goals, 21
targets and 60 indicators is well beyond the scope of this chapter, it
is important to make note of a few key milestones in the MDG
process as a whole in order to make sense of our account of the
evolution and application of MDG 7.D.71 The targets that became
the MDGs find their roots in geopolitics and development
discourses that preceded them. The end of the Cold War reduced
the East-West paralysis between Western and USSR-aligned blocs
at the United Nations.72 While the human development approach
took hold through the 1990s, and within that the Human
Development Index (HDI), several international summits and
conferences proved foundational to the later articulated MDGs.
The earliest was that of the International World Summit for
Children in 1990, followed by the International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD) in September 1994, and both
the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and the
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 1995. The Social
Summit in particular was ‘crucial for the MDGs as global
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consensus was reached that poverty eradication was the priority for
development,’ (as originally emphasised).73
Around this time, the OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee established a Groupe de Réflexion to examine all the
declarations and concluding resolutions from the UN summits in
the early 1990s. In May 1996, the Groupe published their first
paper in which they set out six quantitative ‘International
Development Goals’ (IDGs). Like the later MDGs, the IDGs were
concerned with issues of poverty, education, and health and set a
deadline of 2015 for achievement. Although the goals were
initially given limited attention, they slowly gained more traction
as the Millennium Summit drew near.74
In March 2000, the UN released a report entitled We the
Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, which
re-visioned the UN’s role in development. Among other things, the
report declared ‘a more people-oriented United Nations must be a
more results-based organization,’ (as originally emphasised). 75
As would be seen, the We the Peoples report captured many of the
themes that would later form the Millennium Declaration. Like the
OECD-DAC’s IDGs, it drew together resolutions from the UN
conferences of the 1990s, but on a broader range of topics.76
In September 2000, 189 countries signed the Millennium
Declaration. To avoid having the unprecedented international
commitment slip into obscurity, the UN quickly set about creating
tangible goals around which to anchor the promises made in the
Declaration. A group was soon established to translate the
Declaration into a list of targets and indicators. Interestingly, this
was the same group77 that had worked together to create the list of
IDGs released jointly by the UN, OECD, World Bank, and IMF
report in October 2000, one month following the signing of the
Declaration.78
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After the passage of the Millennium Declaration, there was
a perceived need to avoid duplication of global efforts, and the
IDGs presented an attractive and convincing model around which
to mobilize support. Efforts were then taken to transform the IDGs
from donor goals to global goals.79 It was no easy feat, as Karver,
Kenny and Sumner noted, since the MDG creators had to walk a
‘tightrope’ between the ambitious targets that had been agreed to in
prior UN summits and conferences, and targets that were
politically palatable and therefore fell within the realm of
possibility.80
The eight MDGs were officially revealed on 6 September
2001 through the Road map towards the implementation of the
United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary
General. 81 Of the seven key objectives listed in the Millennium
Declaration, only one became fundamental to the MDG framework
– that of development and poverty eradication. 82 Others, such as
those relating to peace, security, disarmament, human rights and
democracy, were left behind. Hayman argued that such limits
made it easier for donors to justify policies that focused solely on
MDG targets.83
The resulting MDG goals were originally set out as global
goals, however there was soon pressure for those same goals to be
taken on as country targets. The problem with this was that global
goals were set outside of any consideration of particular countries
historical experiences and thus each goal was not necessarily
attainable at the country level by every country.84
To the extent that the list of goals was based largely on
goals previously created by the OECD, World Bank, and IMF
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can be understood as an extension and elaboration of the
‘development project’ described at the outset of this chapter. This
dynamic led some to argue that the MDG concentration on
developing country issues serves to ‘ghettoize the problem of
development and [locate] it firmly in the third world.’85 And yet,
once the contested process of framing, selecting, and defining was
completed, the MDG targets were presented to the world not as
political, but as technical problems, 86 illuminating as discussed
above one of the ways in which quantification operates to obscure
its social embeddedness. At the global level, the MDGs operated as
a powerful vehicle for the production of knowledge about poorer
nations, re-‘making’ the world in ways that Truman would have
found familiar, with ongoing, albeit unacknowledged,
consequences. The development project is at this point so
thoroughly embedded within the common sense of international
institutions that it can be difficult to envision alternatives at the
macro-level. The implications of particular practices of
measurement can more readily be grasped in the moment of
intervention or imposition of particular new measurements or
targets, such as in the case of MDG Target 7D.
MDG 7D was drawn from the inaugural report of an
umbrella organization called Cities Alliance, a partnership between
the World Bank, UN-Habitat, and a small handful of governments
and nongovernmental organizations, formed in the late 1990s.
Cities Alliance launched the ‘Cities without Slums Action Plan ’at
its inaugural 1999 meeting. 87 The Plan found new form as
Millennium Development Goal 7, target 11, later revised as
Millennium Development Goal 7D. The Millennium Declaration
of September 2000 explicitly recognized this link: ‘By 2020, to
have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100
million slum dwellers as proposed in the ‘Cities Without Slums’
initiative.’ 88 It is important to note that at the time of the
Millennium Declaration, no universally accepted definition for the
term ‘slum’ existed. Indeed, in the decades prior, countries had
rarely included data on slums in their development reports. 89
Given that the objective of the Millennium Declaration was to
85
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‘mainstream a set of inter-connected and mutually reinforcing
development goals into a global agenda,’ it followed that the
inclusion of a ‘slum’ target in the universalized MDG project
would require a universal definition for this complex
phenomenon.90 In identifying ‘slums’ as a problem for cities that
aspired to be modern, the Cities Alliance initiative and the ensuing
MDG process called for the creation of a new area of knowledge
and expertise. Unsurprisingly, the work of defining, tracking and
targeting this new global entity of the ‘slum’ fell to a small group
of already identified global development ‘experts’.
In October 2002, thirty-five international experts joined
Cities Alliance and UN Habitat staff in Nairobi to formulate ‘an
operational definition of security of tenure and slums’91 over two
days. They produced a series of ‘sub-indicators’ to measure both
security of tenure and slums, as well as ‘composite indices and
meta-indicators.’92 While it was recognized that the definitions and
indicators agreed upon would continue to be modified, this small
group of people ostensibly succeeded in casting a universal
definition of what it meant to live in a slum. A slum household was
defined as ‘a group of individuals living under the same roof that
lack one or more of: access to improved water; access to improved
sanitation; durability of housing; security of tenure; [and/or]
sufficient living area’.93
As we’ve discussed in the previous section, the background
‘work’ of constructing an indicator involves often difficult and
contentious selections of emphasis – some elements are
highlighted at the expense of others. However, there is often a
certain inevitability, or path dependency, associated with the
process of narrowing that accompanies the identification of data
points that can be tracked. Statistics that are already being gathered
tend to be selected; elements for which no current data exists will
be dropped. Not surprisingly, the most difficult element of the
slum definition the experts in Nairobi discussed measuring was
security of tenure. The group defined security of tenure as ‘the
right of all individuals and groups to effective protection from the
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state against unlawful evictions.’ 94 This definition reflects the
concern that security of tenure be defined in a way that addressed
the problems associated with its absence. While ultimately security
of tenure remained included in the universal definition of slum
noted above, unlike all other elements of the definition, indicators
for the concept were left to be ‘defined later’.
The ‘slum’ definition and indicators that came out of the
Nairobi meeting in 2003 continued to evolve, as elements of slums
that could be most amenable to measurement were foregrounded
and more problematic elements were cast away. Security of tenure
would ultimately prove too difficult to measure and be removed
from the slum definition, notwithstanding clear evidence that it
was central to urban development and protection from forced
evictions and other human rights violations. A 2006 UNEP report
on MDG progress called it a particularly difficult indicator to
measure, but at the same time ‘one of the most essential elements
of a successful shelter strategy.’95
While the original MDG targets and framework were
reportedly settled in 2003,96 the importance of security of tenure
became less recognized over time as the measurability of the
indicator remained in question, and targets and indicators for the
other ‘elements’ of the slum definition were solidified, tracked
and recorded. The 2005 World Summit led the UN Secretary
General to recommend the addition of four new MDG targets (A,
B, C and D). In 2007, the UN General Assembly agreed to
include these four additional targets and re-organize the MDG,
reframing the slum target from Goal 7, Target 11 to MDG Target
7D. This new official framework ‘supersede[d] the previous
version,’97 effectively excluding security of tenure from the MDG
slum definition and MDG discourse, with little explanation or
notice. The UN Statistics division concisely notes the outcome of
this culling process in a footnote: ‘...since information on secure
tenure is not available for most of the countries, only the first four
indicators are used to define slum household, and then to estimate
the proportion of urban population living in slums’.98
Security of tenure did not disappear altogether in
development discourse and programming, but its prominence,
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legitimacy, and funding were dramatically impacted. Tenure
security was relegated to a separate ‘track’ through the UN
Habitat’s Global Campaign for Secure Tenure. Even as MDG
programming continued apace and MDG progress reports
repeatedly cast security of tenure as too difficult to measure, the
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Housing convened its [his]
own expert working groups on indicators for the right to housing,
including secure tenure. This schism presents one intriguing
avenue for future research. Interviews with participants in the
discussions that took place within UN and intergovernmental
institutions and at past expert meetings where the slum target was
formulated and operationalized might reveal tensions between
rights talk and efficiency-oriented approaches to growth jostling
for prominence.99 Reconstructing the debates among experts could
reveal the political stakes of different methods and modes of
quantification that remain opaque in the ensuing data. What can be
noted without access to these insights, however, is that the element
of tenure security calls for recognition of the right to land use and
occupation by the poor, situating their rights vis-à-vis others – a
relative, rather than an absolute, approach to poverty and poverty
alleviation that problematizes and politicizes land inequality in
cities in a way that improved water and sanitation campaigns do
not.
In what was perhaps an effort to avoid politics, the excision
of security of tenure from the MDG slum target was a political
choice itself. Seemingly based on exigencies of measurement and
the political volatility of the tenure indicator, rather than other
factors that might arguably be more closely linked to the goal of
bringing about ‘improvements’ in living conditions of the urban
poor, it was a decision that had significant effects not only on the
production of knowledge about slums and slum residents, but also
on the ways in which governments acted to achieve the targets.100
We don’t want to be read as suggesting that a better decision
would have been to include - and therefore, find a way to quantify
- the right to tenure security. Rather, our claim is a more basic one
about the entangled relationship between defining and measuring.
Our argument is that in relation to the MDG Target 7.D, as with
the various other development indicators we’ve discussed in this
chapter, it is in the process of ‘making the myriad decisions
99
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necessary to operationalize a (legal) definition,’ such as UN
Habitat’s definition of a ‘slum’, that the phenomenon itself is
produced.101
E. Conclusion
Perhaps targeting a problem is not always as useful as situating a
problem. Perhaps it encourages us to focus on symptoms rather
than causes; perhaps it leaves unaddressed, and hence intact, the
many direct and indirect sources of the problem that we seek to
solve or alleviate.102

Though the debates over methodology and measurement in relation
to development outcomes are both convoluted and contentious, the
technocratic nature of the development project as it emerged in the
postwar moment remains a constant. Insofar as the project of
international ‘development’ was conceived fundamentally as a
project of (economic) measurement, comparison and
quantification, the indicators and statistics in use at a given time
provide determinate content to the aspirational project of
development. Development indicators frame both objects and
outcomes through a transformative lens which conflates means and
ends; equating the collection of ever more quantifiable and
globally commensurable data points with the project of realizing
stated ambitions of global development institutions, as exemplified
by the World Bank’s own slogan ‘Our Dream is a World Free of
Poverty’.
From the postwar prominence of GNP to the Millennium
Development Goals, the perspective taken by the ‘development
project’ has been a high level ‘view from above’ which presumes
that we can ‘see’ a national economy as a totality and measure its
successes and failures in aggregative terms and moreover, that
101
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those statistics can be usefully compared with those of other
‘national economies’. In this chapter, we have explored the process
by which the ‘power of numbers’ operates within development
discourse. In particular, we have sought to reveal something of the
process, or ‘work’, through which these difficult and contestable
choices about what issues to give priority to and which data to
track, become ‘black-boxed’ in the ensuing indicator, such that the
resulting ‘data’ appear straightforward and ‘factual’. We have also
explored the ways in which some topics come to seem both
evidently priorities and inherently ‘measurable’ (income poverty)
while other issues remain stubbornly beyond the reach of both
statistical indices and public attention. Drawing on the robust body
of recent scholarship on development indicators, we have
illustrated the ways in which these metrics tend to remake the
world they are purporting only to reflect; the governance
implications of the production of quantitative data that is globally
commensurate; and the ways in which indicators make claims to
authority. We have also noted the related and growing significance
of the production and circulation of visualizations of quantitative
information such as development indicators.
We have suggested ways that the complex social process
that unfolded between the articulation of lofty global aspirations in
the Millennium Declaration and the searchable set of data points,
data visualizations and reports that emerged from the MDGs in
2015 might be studied and understood as a constitutive process, a
type of world-making with profound consequences for poorer
countries. Our short history of MDG 7.D in the final section of the
chapter sought to illuminate some of the particularities of its
production and operationalization, the configuration of the
relations between the ‘technical’ and the ‘political’ in the
definition and measurement of slums, and to suggest how that
process contributes to re-defining the appropriate nature and scope
of development policy in urban contexts. We argue that the
operationalization of the MDG 7.D target effectively reduced a
complex and diverse field of urban development planning and
policy to a narrow (and politically contentious) definition of the
‘slum’ buttressed by a very limited number of quantifiable
indicators. In the context of the global profile of the MDGs, the
aggregate of these quantifiable indicators came to determine which
neighbourhoods counted as ‘slums’, notwithstanding the
heterogeneity of built environments and populations residing in
urban settlements around the world. Moreover, the coalesced
support of international institutions for the MDGs lent a
considerable amount of momentum to the City without Slums
target and its partial and reductive set of indicators, potentially
overriding more complex analyses and policy recommendations
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regarding the diverse circumstances of the marginally housed
urban poor. The way in which this target was operationalized, and
in particular the decision not to track security of tenure, an element
that could have revealed pertinent differences in the ways in which
different jurisdictions sought to improve their statistics on the
indicator, is a poignant illustration of the necessary corollary to the
MDG slogan ‘what gets measured gets done.’ In the realm of
quantified knowledge production for development, it might equally
be claimed: ‘what doesn’t get measured, doesn’t count’.
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